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First, we show a new inexpensive defense against intruders and the man-in-the-middle attack in the
Kirchhoff's-loop-Johnson-like-noise (KLJN) cipher. Then instead of point-to-point communication, we
propose a high efficiency, secure network. The (in the idealistic case totally secure) classical network is
based on an improved version of the KLJN cipher. The network consists of two parallel networks: i) a
chain-like network of securely communicating, electrically isolated Kirchhoff-loops with Johnson-like
noise and driven by a specific switching process of the resistances; ii) and a regular non-secure data
network with a Coordinator-server. If the classical network is fast enough, the chain-like network of N
communicators can generate and share an N bit long secret key within a single clock period of the ciphers
and that implies a significant speed-up compared to the point-to-point key exchanges used by quantum
communication or RSA-like key exchange methods. This is a teleportation-type multiple telecloning of
the classical information bit because the information transfer can take place without the actual presence of
the information bit at the intermediate points of the network. At the point of the telecloning, the clone is
created by the product of a bit coming from the regular network and a secure bit from the local KLJN
ciphers. The same idea could be implemented with quantum communicator pairs producing entangled
secure bit at the two ends. This is the telecloning of classical bits via quantum communicator networks
without telecloning the quantum states.
Keywords: Unconditionally secure; network key distribution; classical telecloning; telecloning of classical
bits via quantum channel; stealth communication.
1. Introduction: totally secure statistical physical communicator with Kirchoff-loop
and Johnson(-like) noise
Recently, a totally secure classical communication scheme was introduced [1,2] utilizing
two identical pairs of resistors and noise voltage generators, the physical properties of an
idealized Kirchoff-loop and the statistical physical properties thermal noise, see Figures 1 and
2. The resistors (low bit = small resistor RS , high bit = large resistor RL ) and their noise
voltage generators are randomly chosen and connected at each clock period at the two sides
of the information channel. A secure bit exchange takes place when the states at the two ends
are different, which is indicated by an intermediate level of the rms noise voltage on the line,
or that of the rms current noise in the wire. The most attractive properties of the KLJN cipher
are related to its security [1, 3-5] and the robustness of classical information. In the idealized
scheme of the Kirchoff-loop-Johnson(-like)-noise (KLJN) cipher, the passively observing
eavesdropper can extract zero bit of information. The total security of the idealized system is
based on Statistical Physics, and inherently connected to the Second Law of Thermodynamics
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2(Fluctuation-Dissipation Theorem), the Energy Conservation Law (Kirchhoff's Loop-Law)
and the rules of algebraic linear equation systems (N independent equations are needed to
determine N unknown variables).
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Figure 1. Secure key generation and distribution via the Kirchhoff-loop-Johnson(-like)-noise (KLJN) cipher
(idealized picture). The joint information of the two end-bits is carried by the statistics of the rms noise voltage and
current in the channel. Secure bit exchange takes place whenever the end-bits are different (intermediate value of the
rms noise voltage and current). To extract the secure information bit of one end, the knowledge of this joint
information and that of the information bit at the other end is needed. The passive eavesdropper can access only the
joint information, so she knows that the bits are opposite, but she has zero information about the actual end bit.
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Figure 2. Channel noise rms voltage level due to the random bits at the two ends of the line; and secure bit exchange
in the KLJN cipher. The rms value is obtained through a single clock period. On the average, only 50% of the clock
periods can exchange secure bits. The eavesdropper does not know which end of the line has the low and which one
has the high bit.
2. On the security of the KLJN cipher
Though there have been many comments about the fact that the practical cipher is not
totally secure (see their refusals [4,5] and a correct point [6]), the total security of the
idealized (mathematical model) system remains unchallenged. The ideality of the KLJN
cipher means that the physical/circuit model [1] shown in Figure 1 must be the correct
description of the situation. This requirement implies an ultimate high-frequency limit [1] for
any normal or parasite frequency components in the channel to avoid wave affects (delay,
3propagation, reflection, etc.). This "no-wave" bandwidth limit is scaling with the reciprocal of
the wire length [1]. Moreover, any other deviations from the model in Figure 1, such as
parasite elements or other modification pose the risk of information leak [3-6]. The most
significant, practical, non-ideality problems are the cable resistance pointed out by many
commenters, first by Janos Bergou [6] and the cable capacitance [3]. However, by using
sufficiently thick wires, these problems can be eliminated and the idealized situation and total
security can arbitrarily be approached depending on the available resources. The situation is
similar to the case of quantum communication where the theoretical security can only be
approached but can never be reached due to the lack of ideal single-photon source, and the
noise in the cannel and the detectors.
3. The earlier and new, economical solutions for defense against intruders and the
man-in-the-middle attack
The intrusive eavesdropper, who emits a large and short current pulse in the channel, can
extract only one bit of information while she is getting discovered [1]. The KLJN cipher with
public channel for comparing currents is naturally protected against the man-in-the-middle
(MITM) attack [3] and the eavesdropper is discovered with a very high probability while or
before she can extract a single bit. Enhanced security can be reached by comparing the
voltages and then the eavesdropper is discovered with a very high probability before she can
extract a single bit of information [3]. The fastest key distribution with the highest security
needs these defenses, see Sections 7 and 8. However as an economical solution, it is possible
to detect the eavesdropping using only the statistical analysis of the noise (similarly to
quantum communication) however that method would allow the eavesdropper to extract a
number of bits before she gets discovered, just like at quantum communication. On the other
hand, in the case of the man-in-the middle attack, a 4-bits average security can be reached if
the parties communicate via the public channel only the fact of secure bit exchange, which is
a satisfactory and inexpensive solution. It is so because the man-at-the-middle cannot predict
the time when the end bits and its own bits will favor a secure bit pair alignment. Thus, on the
average, after 4 bits one communicator will see secure transfer but the other one does not,
consequently their exchanged public information will contradict and the "eavesdropping
alarm" goes on. This economical solution requires exchanging the same number of bits via
the secure and the public channel. However, see Sections 7 and 8, the unconditional security
will require extra clock steps which will slow down the key generation and distribution by a
factor of 2 or 3.
4. The enhanced KLJM communicator with complementary loops
The original KLJN cipher exchanges secure bits only 50% of the time. This property can
cause an exponential slow-down versus distance if the information is measured and further
transmitter in a network of coupled KLJN ciphers. In the rest of this paper, first we show an
enhanced KLJN communicator which exchanges bits at 100% of the time. Then we show a
network solution where the intermediate network elements do not have to decode the
information in order to forward it. Because the information "gets through" a chain of
transmitters without even being there, the mechanism is a classical teleportation [7] effect,
more precisely, telecloning because the information will be present at both the source and the
receiver Units. In this paper, we will apply the following convenient mathematical fashion.
We will represent the "high" information bit by +1 and the "low" information bit by -1. Thus
4if A  is the logic state of a port driving one end of a KLJN cipher then the inverse satisfies
  A = -A  .
The enhanced KLJN communicator makes use of each clock period by using two KLJN
ciphers driven in anticorrelated way, see Figure 3. This lossless KLJN communicator consists
of two electrically isolated parallel KLJN loops with ports driven in the same fashion at one
end and in a complementary way at the other end. Then one of the loops will always
communicate a secure bit because the logical state will be opposite at the ends of one of the
loops.
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Figure 3. Lossless unsecure KLJN communication with two parallel ports. Each clock period transfers a bit.
However the data are not secure as soon as the eavesdropper learns the port arrangement.
An important weakness is that the communicator shown in Figure 3 is not secure if the parties
must agree through a regular network about who is running the correlated and who does the
complementary ports. As soon as the eavesdropper learns the port arrangement, she can
apparently decode the bit status at the two ends.
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Figure 4. The Secure Complementary (SC) cipher and the secure distribution of the port control.
However, by using the totally secure nature of the KLJN communication, it is possible to
arrange the port distribution in an unconditionally secure way; let us call this Secure
Complementary (SC) cipher. The secure sharing of the parallel KLJN ports of
Communicators (A) and (B) is done one time only, at the initialization. The ports A1 and B1
are randomly driven (connecting one of their resistors) at each clock period until a secure bit
is exchanged between them (intermediate rms noise voltage level). Then, for example, they
can use the following pre-agreed table for sharing:
Situation of
secure bits
Low (-1) at B1
High (1) at A1
Low (-1) at A1
High (1) at B1
Resulting port
control
  A1 = A2
  B1 = B 2 ª -B2
  A1 = A 2 ª -A2
  B1 = B2
Table 1. Truth table of sharing the port controls at the SC cipher.
5The SC communicator is also lossless and it communicates a secure bit at each clock period
with total security in the idealized case, see Figure 5.
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Figure 5. Example of channel noise rms voltage levels at lossless KLJN communication. All clock periods provide a
secure exchange of (inverse) bits via one of the lines. Because the eavesdropper does not know the port control rules,
she cannot access the information.
5. Networks: initialization and high-speed bit-exchange via telecloning
In this section, we describe the network and a simple initialization process. However, this
initialization process allows certain vulnerabilities against the "Mingesz attacks" (see Section
7) especially during the first network-key generation run. In Section 7, we shall describe the
more time-demanding but totally secure initialization process. In Section 8, we describe the
most economical and still satisfactory solution.
The KLJN network consists of electrically isolated Kirchhoff loops driven in a specific
way and a regular network with a special Coordinator-server. For the sake of simplicity, but
without the restriction of generality, we consider a one-dimensional (chain-like) network
where the network Units are connected only to their two nearest neighbors, see Figure 6.
First, we describe the KLJN cipher Units of the network. The connection between the
network Units is made by SC cipher channels, see Figure 7. One SC connection is to the left
hand neighbor via the left hand side ports L and the other one is to the right hand side
neighbor via the ports R. The initialization of the units is described below.
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Figure 6. The M-th and (M+1)-th Units of the one-dimensional network and their external connections.
i) In the simplest case the initialization is similar to the SC cipher initialization described
above (see also Sections 7,8). This is done one time only if the units are defended by the
current/voltage method [3] (see Sections 7,8). The ports R1M  and   L1
M+1
 of Units (M) and
(M+1) are randomly driven (connecting one of their resistors) at each clock period until a
secure bit is exchanged between them (intermediate rms noise voltage level). Then, for
example, they can use the following pre-agreed table for sharing:
6Situation of
secure bits
Low (small resistor) at 
  
L1
M+1
High (large resistor) at R1M
Low (small resistor) at R1M
High (large resistor) at 
  
L1
M+1
Resulting port
control
  
R1
M
= R2
M
  
L1
M+1
= -L2
M+1
  
R1
M
= -R2
M
  
L1
M+1
= L2
M+1
Table 2. Truth table of sharing the port controls between two nearest neighbors in the chain-like KJLN network.
Now, let us see how the network works. The Units are connected via the secure lossless
KLJN chain described above and they communicate through the regular network, too, see
Figure 7. After the initialization described above, the Units generate random bits so that they
satisfy their port control initialization rules and the actual internal logic connection rule
(regenerated at each clock period). The Units report the
L1
1
 
R1
1
L2
1
 
R2
1
L1
2
                   
R1
2
L2
2
                   
R2
2
L1
3
                   
R1
3
L2
3
                    
R1
3
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Figure 7. KLJN cipher based network for high-speed secret key generation and distribution via telecloning, with
100% fidelity, through chains of electrically isolated Kirchhoff loops. This system provides the highest speed when
the defense is current/voltage based [3], see Sections 7 and 8. Note, a very good alternative can be realized with
single wire R-L connections and regular KLJN ciphers (see Section 8).
logic relation F (+1 or -1) between their secure bit at their L-ports and their secure bit at their
R ports to the Coordinator-server (CS) of the regular network. Let us suppose that Unit (N)
wants to clone the actual secure bit at the left hand side of Unit (M), where M<N. Then Unit
(N) sends this request to the CS. The CS calculates
  
GM, N = (-1) N - M Fj
j= M
N -1
÷   , (1)
where GM, N  is the logic relation between the secure bit at the L
M
 ports of Unit (M) and the
secure bit at the L( N )  ports of Unit (N); and Fi  is the reported logic relation between the
secure bit at the L j  ports and secure bit at the R j  ports of Unit (j) . Thus Unit (N) will make
the following calculation:
  
XL
M
= GM, N XL
N
   , (2)
where XL
M
 is the secure bit at the LM  ports of Unit (M) and XLN  is the secure bit of the LN
7ports of Unit (N). Because Unit (N) knows the secure bit values at his own ports and because
he receives the GM, N  information from the CS, he can evaluate Equation 3 and that is
equivalent with the (tele)cloning of the XLM  secure bit with 100% fidelity. Let us see, why
this process is a telecloning. The XL
M
 clone is the product of two information bits, the GM, N
arriving via the regular network from CS and the local secure bit XL
N
. Therefore, the
information does not exist on the chain of intermediate Units. It looks like it is "teleported"
via the chain built of electrically isolated Kirchoff loops. However, because the XL
M
 bit stays
intact at its original location during this operation, the proper term is telecloning, not
teleportation.
We would like to mention that the expressions of "teleportation" and "telecloning" of
information arise from the research on quantum communication (see for example [8,9]) and
they had been considered as the unique properties of quantum systems, just like secure
physical layers for communications. However, recently it was shown by Oliver Cohn [10]
that classical teleportation of classical information is also possible. In his model, he was using
boxes and coins and reached the teleportation of information by a total, 100%, fidelity. In the
present paper we have reported telecloning of information also with total, 100%, fidelity,
which is impossible to reach in a quantum system due to fundamental mathematical
constraints [9] of the telecloning operations and due to the extreme fragility of quantum
information.
6. High-speed secret key distribution over the whole network
Because the CS collects all the logic relations between the secure bits at the L and R ports of
each Units, CS can provide the relevant Gk ,m  bit for Unit (m) to teleclone the secure bit at the
L ports of Unit (k). This information can be given to all Units simultaneously about all the
other Units. In this way, each Unit can teleclone all the secure bits at the other Units, for each
clock period, provided the regular network is fast enough. That means, if the network consist
of N Units, an (N-2) bit long secret key is generated and securely distributed over the whole
network at each clock period. (We supposed that the L ports of Unit (1) and the R ports of the
last Unit in the chain are not connected; this is the reason for the -2 correction of N). If the
regular network is slow, the X  bits can be recorded by the Units and they can make the
telecloning later when they receive the relevant G  bits.
As illustration, let us do a simple estimation. Let us suppose that 1% of New York's
population (200 thousand people) installs a KLJN cipher based network card in their PC and
they are connected by a pair of wires in a chain-like fashion, see Figure 7. They are also
connected to the internet and a central CS server with their regular Eternet card. Let us
suppose that the distance between nearest neighbors is less then 1 km. Then it is very
convenient to run the KLJN ciphers with a bandwidth 1000 bit/second or greater. Thus the
theoretical speed of secret key generation and distribution to each computer in the network
would be 200 Megabit/second. Such a network and key generation/distribution speed is far
beyond of not only the reach of any quantum communicator system but also that of the RSA
and other software key distribution methods. Of course, this speed is much higher than any
PC can handle, thus the clock frequency of the KLJN ciphers could be reduced by orders of
magnitude and the key generation and distribution could be still fast enough. The very
8important implication of this fact is that the requirements about the wire-pair connection of
the KLJN cipher chain could be very low.
Alternatively, a much smaller network population could generate and distribute secret
keys at sufficient speed. For example, 100 Units with 1000/bit/second clock frequency would
generate and share a secret key by 100 kbit/second speed.
Note, the above-described speed holds for the current/voltage based defense only. More
economical solutions will result in a speed reduction by a factor of 3 (see Sections 7,8).
7. Enhancements for total security at economic design to avoid the "Mingesz" attacks
One of us (Robert Mingesz) [11] has pointed out two important vulnerabilities of the network
described above. In this section, we describe the problem and show one type of the possible
solutions.
i) If during the initialization described in Section 5 at point i) a brief man-in-the-middle-
attack takes place and if the system is defended against the man-in-the-middle attack by
the economic solution described in section 3, the eavesdropper (with a small probability)
may get the value of the secure bit because 4 bit eavesdropping is needed (on the
average) to discover the man-in-the-middle.
ii) A much more serious problem is that when the eavesdropper attacks the regular network
at Unit (k), and because that network is not totally secure (at least at the beginning) she
may get the G j,k  functions for each j  location. But that set of G j,k  functions is either
the key or its inverse, depending on the local bit at Unit (k).
These problems must be fixed for the total security and this needs a more elaborate
initialization resulting in a factor of 2 reduction of the network speed.
iii) Either the SC communicator port initialization/distribution must be done after each N-bit
key generation or the man-in-the-middle defense should be the more expensive
current/voltage based defense described in [3]. The fastest way of part of SC
initialization/distribution is described here. During the secure port (re)distribution the
Units should be run so that all ports change randomly and independently at the beginning
of each clock period until a new port distribution is reached in accordance with the truth
table, Table 3 (confer Section 5, Table 2). This method results in a new port distribution
after 4/3 clock periods, on the average.
9Situation of
secure bits
Low at 
  
L1
M+1
High at R1
M
     and/or
Low at 
  
L2
M+1
High at R2
M
Low R1
M
High at 
  
L1
M+1
     and/or
Low at R2
M
High at 
  
L2
M+1
All other cases
Resulting
port control
  R1
M
= R2
M
  
L1
M+1
= -L2
M+1
  R1
M
= -R2
M
  
L1
M+1
= L2
M+1
Do it again
(No port
distribution)
Table 3. Truth table of the high-speed secure sharing of the port controls between the two nearest neighbors, Unit
(M) and Unit (M+1), in the chain-like KJLN network. Only secure bit exchanges generate a new port distribution.
The mean time needed is 4/3 clock periods because, from the 16 possibilities, 12 results in a new port distribution.
iv) As part of the initialization process, the very first N-bit secret key distribution has to be
done in a slower way, without telecloning. Moreover, the Coordinator-server should also
possess one Unit of the network. Let us suppose that the right ports of Unit (1) and the
left ports of Unit (2) act as the first network-key generator. Unit (1)'s R ports and Unit
(2)'s L ports generate, share and store an N-bit long key during N clock periods. At the
same time, all other connected L and R ports also generate N-bit long keys for the
communication between the nearest neighbors. Then by using the regular network and
the key shared between Units (1) and (2), Unit (2) sends the N-bit long network-key to
Unit (3). Then Unit (3) forwards the network-key to Unit (4) by using the regular
network and the key generated between them, and so on... In this way, after N clock
periods and then forwarding the keys in N-1 subsequent steps via the fast regular
network, all Units, including the Coordinator-server, will learn the first, N-bit long
network-key generated by Units (1) and (2). From that moment on, this key and its
successors should be used for the communication between the Coordinator-server and the
Units. The result is very close to a one-time-pad type encryption. Taking the New York
example mentioned above, and assuming that one step of sending the network-key in the
regular network to the nearest neighbor takes the same time as the clock period of the
KLJN ciphers, this totally secure initialization would take 400 seconds. After this   º7
minutes initialization process, the network begins the fast and continuous production of
totally secure keys. Due to the redistribution of ports after each N-bit key distribution, the
speed of secure key generation and whole-distribution would be about the third of the
speed mentioned above, about 70 Mbit/second.
8. The simplest and most economical network solution
As it is pointed out in 7/iii, the inexpensive defense solution with the required SC port
redistribution will need and extra 4/3 clock period time at each network key generation. This
requirement will slow down the key generation/distribution by more than a factor of 2.
Practically, the network key generation will need 3 clock steps. Therefore, it is worthwhile to
consider the use a much simpler network based on simple KLJN loops instead of the SC type
complementary loops. Indeed, if on Figure 7, we use only single right and left ports the
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connected Rk  and   Lk +1  ports represent a regular KLJN cipher, as described in [1]. They can
switch randomly at each clock period and, on the average, every second clock period
produces a secure bit. The network, its initialization and running are basically the same (with
minor differences) as described for the SC cipher based network. This very simple system is
at least as fast as the SC cipher based system with the economical defense (Section 3).
Practically, every 3rd clock step will produce and distribute a network key of N bits.
Therefore, the SC cipher based solution seems to have only one advantage: with the
current/voltage based defense solution, it has the highest speed, about 3 times faster than that
of the other solutions.
9. Remarks questions, perspectives
It is important to note that the network described in Figure 7 is very different from the
basically point-to-point key distribution methods used by quantum communication and
software solutions. Even though, the possibility of telecloning of quantum states to multiple
receivers has been pointed out by van Loock and Braunstein [8] the fidelity is poor (<71%)
and to reach an acceptable fidelity (>50%) the number of Units has to be limited to 30.
Moreover, each Unit has to be connected to all the other Units by a separate communicator
and separate lines, which means   N (N -1) communicator devices and   (N 2 - N ) / 2  lines
indicating that the method is essentially a point-to-point communication type. For the New
York example mentioned above, such a quantum telecloning solution requires about 200
thousand communicator devices at each Unit and that requires almost 40 billion
communicator devices and nearly 40 billion optical cables. Moreover, these 40 billion
connections are both short-distance and long-distance ones because we have to directly
connect the farthest Units, too.
On the other hand, the KLJN-based network (Figure 7) requires only two communicator
devices for each intermediate Units and one for the end Units. The intermediate Units have to
be connected only with the two nearest neighbors and the end Units of only one neighbor.
That requires only   2 * (N -1)  communicator devices and   (N -1)  wires. In the New York
example mentioned above, the two communicator devices at each Unit and two wires at each
Unit makes only about 200 thousand communicator devices and about 200 thousand cable
connections, moreover, these connections are all of short distance type, connecting only the
nearest neighbors. If the regular network and the CS are fast enough compared to the KLJN
clock, the whole network receives an N-bit long key at every second KLJN clock period. On
the other hand, the whole network will receive the same key. Therefore, the system is totally
secure only against external attacks: hackers from outside the network. Within the network,
the security, which can be added to the network-key security, is only a regular network
security protecting the information sent to/from to the CS Unit. Thus, we have the same level
of security against hackers within the network, as regular networks do.
This special situation generates a lot of different open questions. For example:
a) What is the proper approach to encryption when we have this continuous high-speed key
generation and simultaneous whole-network-key distribution?
b) Can the generated secure bits be used to increase the security of the internal network?
c) Higher dimensional network topologies and redundancy to protect against broken lines or
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Units down. This can, for example, be realized with server units with more than two (L
and R) ports. The ports Pi (k)    (i = 1...Q)  of the k-th server can be connected to up to Q
different Units. The Coordinator-server would collect the logic relations and evaluate Eq.
1, accordingly.
d) Network redundancy and coding at higher dimensional topologies (?)
e) This network can alternatively be used to announce information to one or more Unit(s) or
to the whole network simultaneously, in a totally secure way. Is there a need for this kind
of solution?
10. Possible application of the idea in quantum communication
There are quantum key distribution schemes which produce entangled secure bits at the two
ends of the line. Concerning the network solution described in Section 8, the same sequence
of ideas, the same network topologies and initialization processes can be applied for such
networks where the KLJN-based Units are replaced by quantum entangled state based Units.
Such a network would produce the multiple telecloning of classical bits via a quantum
communicator networks without telecloning the quantum states. This can (theoretically) be a
100% fidelity process and could be a large chain like network, for example. From these
considerations, it is obvious that the telecloning of quantum states is an unnecessary luxury
because it has many disadvantages, such as the need of separately connecting each units, and
the very low fidelity. What is needed for practical applications: the secure transfer of the
information bit. And that can be done also via the chain-like (or other) type of network of
quantum channels and a regular network with the Coordinator-server. Because there are
situations where wire connection is impossible but optical channel can be realized (like space
communication with laser beam) this type of quantum-based secure classical communication
may be find applications.
11. Conclusion
We have used electrically isolated KLJN ciphers to build enhanced ciphers and network. We
introduced the Secure Complementary (SC) KLJN chiper for the top speed of secure key
generation and exchange. We built network Units from two SC ciphers with random internal
logic relations. We built a one-dimensional network using the network Units and a regular
network with a Coordinator-server (CS). With such a network a high-speed, whole-network,
one-step, secret key distribution can be achieved instead of the slow, point-to-point methods
used by quantum communication or RSA-like key exchange methods. This is a teleportation-
type multiple telecloning of the classical information bit because the information transfer can
take place without the actual presence of the information bit at the intermediate points of the
network. We have shown other, more economical and still fast-enough solutions, too.
In Table 4, a quick comparison between quantum communicators and the KLJN crypto
system is shown.
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Quantum Comm. KLJN Comm.
Physics behind the security Quantum(Fragile information bit)
Classical statistical
(Robust information bit)
Max. number of eavesdropped bits
before 99% probability of
eavesdropper detection
Few thousand 0-4
Vulnerability against the
man-in-the-middle attack Usually yes No
Information leak below the
eavesdropper detection radar
(eavesdropper hiding in noise)
>1% 0.01% or less is easily reachable
Ultimate speed-cut-off versus range Exponential cut-off 1/range cut-off
Network key distribution No. Only point-to-point
Yes. Whole-network key
distribution within two clock
periods
Telecloning Yes, with fidelity < 71% Yes, with 100% fidelity
Network telecloning in one step.
Number of units N .
Only if all Units are directly
connected to each other which
needs   (N 2 - N ) / 2  connections.
Acceptable fidelity (>50%) only
for   N º 30 , or less.
Yes, even if the Units connected
as an arbitrarily large (  N Ø ¶)
chain network (needs only   N -1
connections), within two clock
periods.
Vibration resistant No Yes
Shock resistance Poor Excellent
Dust resistant No Yes
Microelectronic integrated parallel
multi-line (>100) driver chip No Yes
Low-power consumption No Yes
Communicator as a computer card No Yes
Price High Low
Table 4. Quick comparison of quantum communicators (where the quantum states are transferred) with the KLJN
system (March 11, 2006). See disclaimer about the quantum part in the Acknowledgements.
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